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
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## **Dewey's 'Naturalized Hegelianism' in Operation: Experimental Inquiry as Self-Consciousness**

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### **Abstract**

In this paper, I will press Dewey's talk of the self, consciousness, and self-consciousness as it is developed in *Experience and Nature* together with some attention to Dewey's other great experiential text, *Art as Experience*. I will suggest that Hegel's developmental and dialectical understanding of self-consciousness occurs in Dewey's work, albeit in naturalized form. My claim is not that Dewey reproduces Hegel's dialectic, or that Dewey's notion of self-consciousness emerges as isomorphic with Hegel's own. In fact, developing this understanding of consciousness and self-consciousness leads me to conclude that for Dewey, these are roughly equivalent to experimental inquiry and science. To inquire, I claim, is to be 'conscious of.' To inquire experimentally, deliberately, and methodically is to conduct science. Consciousness and self-consciousness emerge as *activities*, rather than as all-pervading states of the organism. In a claim similar to one Hegel makes in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Dewey maintains that intellectual activity—thought and reflection—is the proper occasion for self and other-awareness. The moments of pause, doubt, and unsettlement that Dewey claims are the beginnings of experimental inquiry are also the proper beginnings of consciousness. Dewey's particular take on consciousness is at one with his emergent, as opposed to absolutist, understanding of the self.

*Keywords: Dewey, Hegel, Self-consciousness, Inquiry, Experience and Nature, Phenomenology of Spirit.*

### **Introduction**

In this paper I claim that Hegel's emergent and dialectical understanding of

# *Dewey's 'Naturalized Hegelianism' in Operation: Experimental Inquiry as Self- Consciousness*

SCOTT JOHNSTON



self-consciousness occurs in the thought of John Dewey, albeit in naturalized form. Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and Dewey's talk of the self, consciousness, and self-consciousness as it is developed in *Experience and Nature* together with some attention to Dewey's other great experiential text *Art as Experience*, will form the contexts for my claim. I do not argue that Dewey reproduces Hegel's dialectic or that Dewey's notion of self-consciousness emerges as isomorphic with Hegel's own. In fact, Dewey's understanding of consciousness and self-consciousness lead me to conclude that for Dewey these are roughly equivalent to experimental inquiry and science. I claim to inquire is to be 'conscious of.' To inquire experimentally, deliberately, and methodically is to conduct science. Consciousness and self-consciousness emerge as *activities* rather than as all-pervading states of the organism. In a claim similar to one Hegel makes in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Dewey maintains that intellectual activity—thought and reflection—is the proper occasion for self and other-awareness. The moments of pause, doubt, and unsettlement that Dewey claims are the beginnings of experimental inquiry are also the proper beginnings of consciousness. Dewey's particular take on consciousness is at one with his emergent understanding of the self.

In the first section of the paper, I will summarize recent scholarship on Dewey's use of Hegel. In the second section of the paper I will discuss the Hegelian understanding of consciousness and self-consciousness. This material will be drawn from the first three chapters of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. As the interpretations of Hegel's *Phenomenology* are myriad and often contradictory I will steer a middle course and consider his understanding of consciousness and self-consciousness as both philosophical-religious and genetic-historical, though with a propensity towards recent non-metaphysical readings. In the third section of the paper I will examine certain of Dewey's statements in *Experience and Nature* together with *Art as Experience*. I want to develop a more or less unified understanding of consciousness and self-consciousness as they emerge from these works. In the final section I will suggest that what Hegel does through explicating the dialectic of emergent consciousness and self-consciousness Dewey does through the development and subsequent use of experimental inquiry. For each of these, this is the provision of an ultimately scientific accounting of culture.

Recently a number of key texts have challenged the typical story of Dewey's intellectual development. This is the story Dewey's abandonment of Hegel's Absolute Idealism for naturalism and instrumentalism. John Shook has convincingly shown not only that Hegel and the neo-Hegelian scholars in Britain and America exercised a profound influence on Dewey but that Dewey's empirical and physiological psychology—the supposed 'rival' to Absolute Idealism—was influenced profoundly by Wilhelm Wundt, himself a thinker who combined empiricism and experimentalist psychology with idealism.<sup>1</sup> According to Shook,

Dewey's break with Absolute Idealism took place against the backdrop of a theory of experience that for Dewey as for the Absolute Idealists is active and dynamic. In mutual opposition to Kant, Absolute Idealists *and* Dewey repudiated the transcendentalist reduction of experiences to mental states.<sup>2</sup>

However, in Dewey's opinion Absolute Idealism continued to diminish real experience, because it contrasted it with an ideal of "maximally coherent experience."<sup>3</sup> For Dewey, though, experience is not impoverished. This is the quintessential divergence between Dewey and the Absolute Idealists. Shook understands Absolute Idealism as the (teleological) quest for an Absolute experience that then serves as a model for a more impoverished and less coherent one. Ultimately, Shook claims, vestiges of idealism in Dewey have been fully integrated into his experimentalist outlook. Upon emerging from Absolute Idealism, Shook's Dewey is an instrumentalist, a naturalist, an empiricist, *and* an idealist.<sup>4</sup>

Others have very recently followed Shook in examining the connections between Dewey and Idealism. James Garrison, for example, has noted Dewey's Hegelian roots and the ongoing influence of Hegel on Dewey's intellectual development.<sup>5</sup> James Good has written a book detailing the "Hegelian bacillus" that runs through many of Dewey's works. He argues that the tradition of reading Hegel inaugurated by the St. Louis Hegelians was taken up by Dewey during his years at Vermont and Johns Hopkins. Dewey's notion of experience though naturalistic, is dialectical. Good has investigated Dewey's 'natural dialectic' as a variant of Hegel's dialectic.<sup>6</sup> Good uses the term "experimental idealism" (a term Dewey himself used in his *Study of Ethics* (1894)) to characterize Dewey's experimental outlook.<sup>7</sup> Good also sees 'ideal' in Hegel's sense operating along the lines of 'conscience' in Dewey. Conscience for Dewey plays the role of the 'concrete universal' in Good's estimation.<sup>8</sup>

As the reader can see, Dewey's intellectual debt to Hegel is wholly acknowledged in this recent literature. However, the precise nature of the influence of Hegel on Dewey's specific philosophical programs remains an open question. Areas of influence that have been recently addressed *vis à vis* Hegel's role in Dewey's thought include: the historical development of Dewey's thinking; the construction and aims of the dialectic; the charges against dualistic thinking in metaphysics, ethics, education, and psychology; the tendency to organicism, holism, and reconciliation; the importance of the social realm; and the priority of the 'ethical life' over moral rules. One area that has yet to be investigated is the 'theory' of consciousness and self-consciousness. Consciousness and Self-Consciousness were obviously central to Hegel's thought. It remains an open question whether they were so for Dewey, especially after his supposed 'instrumentalist' turn. Indeed, Dewey's understanding of his own scholarly development suggests otherwise.<sup>9</sup> This may

explain why there has historically been modest emphasis on these matters in his major works and few invocations of Hegel other than for depreciatory purposes.<sup>10</sup> This in turn may have occasioned the typical view that Dewey left questions of consciousness and self-consciousness behind when he abandoned the ‘baggage’ of Absolute Idealism. This view is mistaken. Dewey manifested a variant of Hegel’s model of consciousness and self-consciousness and did so in (at least) one of his most important philosophical works: *Experience and Nature*.

### *Self-Consciousness as Spirit*

#### *Which Reading of Hegel?*

Questions of how best to read Hegel abound. For example, is Hegel’s *Phenomenology* a *Bildungsroman*, an educational novel with its own inner logic? Is it a metaphysical treatise on Absolute Knowing? Is it an epistemological treatise? Is it a social-political-historical narrative of the development of Reason and Freedom? Is it a theological treatise of the Spirit of God on earth? There are proponents of each of these readings and the literature for and against these readings abounds.<sup>11</sup> To complicate the issue further, many of the arguments for these readings are forceful and convincing. This leaves the novice with a conundrum; who is right and which reading ought to be privileged? I cannot answer the question of ‘right;’ however, the reading that comes closest to Dewey in spirit if not in letter is what scholars distinguish as the non-metaphysical reading of Hegel. This is the reading I employ in what follows.

I need to explain further what I mean by non-metaphysical and why I think this is the best reading for my purposes. A non-metaphysical reading of Hegel is one that not only stresses the dynamic, evolving emergent nature of consciousness and self-consciousness (and Reason and Spirit) but also disavows the insistence that the entire system “depends on a categorical base that lays claim to conceptual (or “logical”) necessity.” A non-metaphysical reading will juxtapose alternatives such as linguistic conventions, the giving and taking of reasons in discursive spaces, and historical, social, and cultural phenomena, to necessary categories.<sup>12</sup> Another way to put the point is to say that non-metaphysical readings of Hegel reject the Kantian categorical base upon which Hegel presumably erects his systematic edifice; vestiges of Kantian transcendentalism that remain in Hegel are expunged, and the categories are embedded within the system itself.

To select the non-metaphysical reading of Hegel however is not necessarily to assert a thoroughly *naturalized* reading of Hegel.<sup>13</sup> A thoroughly naturalistic metaphysics then is one in which there are no fixed kinds, no essential or timeless objects or entities and no functions reducible to these. As existences are events they are (by nature) transitory. Whether this is the case with Hegel is debateable; many Hegel scholars,

especially when considering Hegel's logic, think not.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, there are many key passages in the *Phenomenology* that demonstrate Hegel's sympathies with rationalism of various stripes (Plato, Spinoza, Leibniz) and these sympathies most obviously extend to Hegel's discussion of the Absolute through various movements of consciousness, Reason, and Spirit. Hegel clearly saw rationalist alternatives to empiricist claims in many ways superior and evidence of progress in consciousness. I can only provide the briefest sketch of a plausible rejoinder here.<sup>15</sup> Rationalist thought in general and Platonic, Spinozistic, and Leibnizean thought specifically are all sublated in various movements of consciousness and self-consciousness throughout the *Phenomenology*. From the standpoint of Absolute Knowledge the unification of empiricist and rationalist views in the fully self-realized conceptualization of Spirit suggests the impossibility of giving absolute credence to one *or* the other. In any event, there are interpretive limits to characterizing Hegel as *fully naturalized* which I will respect.

*The Emergence of Consciousness 1: Sense-Certainty, Perception, and the Understanding*

Non-metaphysical readings of Hegel take the dynamic evolving movement of consciousness and self-consciousness as basic to his overall project. Though Hegel begins the discussion of Consciousness proper with Sense-Certainty, he does not assume this as the point of departure for knowledge claims. As Hegel reminds, though *self-certainty* regarding Sense-Certainty ("my beliefs about the world and things are the truth of the world and things") is certainly true in one sense we (the philosophically literate public) are more sophisticated than this; we see our role in 'taking-things-as-true'. Any offer of Sense-Certainty to a world sceptical of the possibility of a priori sense-knowledge is itself unsatisfying.

The truth for consciousness of a This of sense is supposed to be universal experience; but the very opposite is universal experience. Every consciousness itself supersedes such a truth experience. Here is a tree, or Now is noon, and proclaims the opposite: Here is *not* a tree, but a house; and similarly, it immediately again supersedes the assertion which set aside the first so far as it is also just such an assertion of a sensuous This. And what consciousness will learn from experience in all sense-certainty is, in truth, only what we have seen. . . . the This as *universal*, the very opposite of what that assertion affirmed to be universal experience.<sup>16</sup>

The attempt to ground truth claims in Sense-Certainty fails; beliefs are irreducibly perceptual as Hegel concludes (and we are led to see). We cannot simply "name" a *This* and claim knowledge (or truth) is evident. We perceive features: characteristics, attributes, and properties. We classify the *This* according to these. The *This* does not come to us fully

formed; it is *mediated* in the act of perceiving. With *Sense-Certainty*, we could talk reasonably only about the singular *This*. With *Perception*, however, we can talk of the many, the multiple, and the manifold. Our claims about *This* are grounded in our perceiving, which forms the context of this second movement of Consciousness. Here we enter the realm of Realism ('nothing is in the intellect that is not first in the senses') and Classical Empiricism. We know something through its *properties*. Hegel says, "This object must now be defined more precisely, and the definition must be developed briefly from the result that has been reached. . . . Since the principle of the object, the universal, is in its simplicity a mediated universal, the object must express this its nature in its own self. This it does by showing itself to be the thing with many properties."<sup>17</sup>

However, Perception is itself limited to representation (*Vorstellung*). As Kant earlier and famously claimed, Percepts without Concepts are blind.<sup>18</sup> Hegel concurs. A representation with no cognition is purposeless. Only when consciousness sees the limitations of itself (as mere perceptual consciousness) can the development towards the concept (*Begriff*) begin. This is an *internal* tension, one that builds up within perceiving consciousness itself. All tension builds up from within. On the one hand, there is what Hegel calls the "determinateness" (*Bestimmtheit*) of sensuous being (or *This*) and, on the other hand, the determinateness of perceptual being (or representation). This unresolved tension festers and is only overcome with consciousness's realization that each has its *raison d'être* in the other; they are both 'beings-for-another'. Yet together they are one. With this realization the 'object as percept' is overcome: "the object in its pure determinatenesses, or in the determinatenesses which were supposed to constitute its essential being [as perceptual object], is overcome just as surely as it was in its sensuous being."<sup>19</sup>

The unity, the bringing together of the two standpoints of consciousness as Sense-Certainty and consciousness as Perception, is provided by the (greater) concept of Force. Force (or more properly, Forces) unites these standpoints through understanding them as aspects of space and time—*This* (the perceptual object) is a product of here, now, and then. *This* is a *This* situated in space with geometrical rules conditioning its presence. Understanding is scientific; now consciousness sees things and perceptions in the context of (scientific) forces rather than mere individuals or manifolds of perceptions, and it is these forces consciousness turns to in explaining the natural world and the various elements bound together in this world.

It is in the movement from Perception to Force that consciousness begins to become aware of itself. Consciousness eventually emerges as fully self-realized through these movements but this self-realization comes at the cost of tearing itself apart. Consciousness is 'sundered'

into multiple distinct and contradictory worlds—an understanding of the world of appearances and an understanding of the world of supersensible law. The world of appearances is the physical world in which (scientific) forces operate to unify and make sense of the world's myriad properties. The world of supersensible law is the noumenal world of laws understood as *a priori*, detached (and detachable) from the physical world they explain. We might say that the first world (of appearances) is the world of Kant's representations; the second world (of Laws) is the world of Kant's pure concepts or categories.<sup>20</sup> The self-sundering of these worlds is complex and Hegel's explication highly controversial; I will provide only the briefest sketch of some major movements.

The emerging consciousness of Understanding takes Force first to be Substance. Substance is merely an evolving thought-object. This is a purely one-sided understanding of Force; it is not yet actualized. Force, however, continues to emerge and becomes scientific concept proper: "In so far as we regard the *first* universal [world] as the Understanding's Notion in which Force is not yet *for itself*, the second [world] is now Force's *essence* as it exhibits itself in and for itself."<sup>21</sup> This "Force as Notion" corresponds roughly to the Kantian pure Concept.<sup>22</sup> Yet, though this concept 'houses' the earlier understanding of Substance it is itself abstract and formal and the world of this supersensible notion is a wholly conceptual one. This conceptual world can (and does) become actual only by vanishing into its other—a process Hegel calls "doubling" (*Verdöplung*). This term occurs several times in Hegel's explication of the tensions and contradictions in the consciousness of understanding as it wrestles with its alternative identities of Force and the Supersensible.<sup>23</sup>

Ultimately reconciliation occurs; the form reconciliation has taken is syllogistic. Aspects of appearance (as percept, as Substance) and concept (as Law, as Noumenon) become middle premises in this logic. Only through the absorption of all appearance and law in the world of self-realizing Understanding can unity of appearance, of force, and of scientific law occur. Hegel invokes the concept of infinity as 'housing' or 'containing' all. The infinite is what contains all in its totality and the Understanding can for the first time see itself as infinite. Here we might think of Kant's exhortation to see Reason as transcending our Faculty of Understanding in the contemplation of vast expanses of nature, as in the judgment of the sublime.<sup>24</sup> Hegel claims, "We see that through infinity, law completes itself into an immanent necessity, and all of the moments of [the world of] appearance are taken up into the inner world."<sup>25</sup> Even here, with the realization of infinity as the totality in which law and appearances combine, immanence rather than transcendence is the conclusion Hegel draws. Even the supersensible (contrary to Kant) is fully immanent. One cannot resist the conclusion that Hegel's metaphysics, even at vital points such as this, are thoroughly

this-worldly. Thus, Understanding becomes truly self-identical and at this moment possesses full self-realization or self-consciousness.<sup>26</sup>

*The Evolution of Consciousness: Self-Consciousness*

It is in the chapter on self-consciousness that Hegel provides us with an accounting of the emergent self. This emergence is a social one inasmuch as the ‘object’ that results in the self’s transformations is the other-as-subject—that is, person(s). Here Hegel makes it evident that self emerges *through* others. Hegel begins his chapter with a discussion of the *concept* of self-consciousness, then proceeds to the *judgment* of self-consciousness, and then to the *syllogism* of self-consciousness. These movements roughly accord with Kant’s treatment of concept, judgment, and syllogism: a concept is a bare notion, a judgment is the use of a concept or notion, and a syllogism is the derivation of a conclusion from a judgment according to Reason.<sup>27</sup> Together these form the rational elements of general logic. However, Hegel considers another element of inestimable importance—an element that Kant does not so regard. This is desire. Desire manifests as the impetus to move away from one state to another in the quest for ongoing gratification. Hegel claims, “In this satisfaction, however, experience makes us aware that the object has its own independence. . . . It is in fact something other than self-consciousness that is the essence of Desire; and through this experience, self-consciousness has itself realize this truth.”<sup>28</sup> Though external or outside ‘objects’ (persons) challenge the nascent self, the impetus to evolve comes from within. The impulsion, “effect[s] the negation within itself; and it must carry out this negation of itself in itself, for it is in itself the negative [object], and must be for the other what it is.”<sup>29</sup> Negation is the possibility for the negative [object] to become what it is. Negating itself, self-consciousness finds that it owes its existence not wholly to itself but to another. “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only [in] being acknowledged.”<sup>30</sup> Self-consciousness is drawn out of itself by this other. The double thrust (within and without) leads to the emergence of the self from its self-enclosed state. On the one hand, the self negates itself; it moves beyond itself. On the other hand, it is thrust towards another which draws it out. “Self-consciousness is faced by self-consciousness; it has come out of itself. This has a twofold significance: first, it has lost itself, for it finds itself as other being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other, for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its own self.”<sup>31</sup>

Desire is the momentum of intellectual, social, and historical changes. It emerges as a sort of *Eros* that is everywhere present and it manifests variously at differing historical times. Desire emerges as a life-force—the essential impetus for (biological) love, caring, familial and social relations. This process by which self-consciousness reflects into

itself and discovers the object it desires Hegel calls “Life.”<sup>32</sup> We are led to think of the context for all human life—the family. The education (*Bildung*) of self-consciousness is the focus of the first movement of self-consciousness. A child develops her identity in part through her parents who have alienated themselves for her sake.<sup>33</sup> It is here in the first movement of self-consciousness that we move from a purely individual and subjective understanding of self-as-conscious to the proper shape of self-consciousness which henceforth is social. Self-consciousness is therefore a self-emerging process that is fundamentally social (and increasingly historical and political) though with its subjective aspects remaining as central features in its totality.

At this juncture, we move from the concept of self-consciousness to the judgment of self-consciousness. On the one hand, self-consciousness finds itself in the other. On the other hand, for it to ‘grow’ it must overcome the other and by doing so overcome itself, tied up as it is in its identification with the other. Hegel calls this phenomenon an “ambiguity.” We might say there is a contradiction that must be overcome in order for self-consciousness to free itself. In so doing it quite properly becomes lord and master over the other. “It must supersede this otherness of itself. This is the supersession of the first ambiguity, and is therefore itself a second ambiguity. First, it must proceed to supersede the other independent being in order thereby to become certain of itself as the essential being; secondly, in so doing it proceeds to supersede its own self, for this other is itself.”<sup>34</sup>

This move to overcome the other (being) in order to become what it is ultimately is a mutual affair. Each other is at once a self-consciousness of its own: a self-conscious being that is also attempting to overcome itself by overcoming the other. This is the “double movement” of self-consciousness.

Now this movement of self-consciousness in relation to another self-consciousness . . . is simply the double movement of the two self-consciousnesses. Each sees the other do the same as it does; each does itself what it demands of the other, and therefore also does what it does only in so far as the other does the same. Action by one side only would be useless because what is to happen can only be brought about by both.<sup>35</sup>

We are now at the point of the “Lordship and Bondage” dialectic made famous in many exegeses of Hegel. Presumably locked in mortal conflict, two rival self-consciousnesses battle for supremacy over one another. As more than one interpreter of Hegel has pointed out this has not only historical corollaries such as the birth of democracy in Ancient Greece, the Peasant’s revolts, and the French Revolution but also social ones such as the parent vs. the child, the student vs. the teacher, and the establishment of friendships.<sup>36</sup> Ultimately each of the

self-consciousnesses realizes that its own being is bound up in the other and “mutual recognition” becomes the basis for genuine movement forward. This is the commencement of the phase that Hegel calls the syllogism of self-consciousness. “Each is for the other the middle term [of a syllogism; i.e., a minor premise], through which each mediates itself with itself and unites with itself; and each is for itself and for the other, and immediate being on its own account, which at the same time is such only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.”<sup>37</sup> This recognition leads both self-consciousnesses to a fundamental conclusion regarding their status vis-à-vis the other. One is lord; the other is slave.<sup>38</sup> The realization occurs that the very thing (negativity) thwarting the slave’s recognition of himself as himself is the inability to place himself at the centre of his bondage. However, once this is recognized the slave realizes that it is in labour that his or her identity is located. The slave in effect is able to begin to become who he or she is. “Through this rediscovery of himself by himself, the bondsman realizes that it is precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he acquires a mind of his own.”<sup>39</sup> It is important to note, beyond the tangible self-conscious freedom of the recognition of the slave’s role in the lord’s livelihood, the slave’s recognition of his own identity as being fully and resolutely his. Freedom consists not only in the slave’s knowledge of his role in the lord’s recognition of himself but also in the slave’s recognition of his role as constitutive of his own identity.

Though freedom is first realized at this moment, it remains a nascent one. Though recognition is mutual and both the lord and slave recognize each other in the fundamental constitution of their respective identities, this is a prelude only to the full development of freedom which manifests only in the consequence of the Protestant Reformation and the Constitutions of the post-Westphalian Nation-States.<sup>40</sup> As freedom here is nascent, it cannot yet instantiate itself socially and politically. The result is crisis which breeds the ideas of stoicism and scepticism. We see the historical-philosophical beginnings of this with the Stoics of ancient Greece and Rome, typified by Epictetus, Cato the Younger, and Cicero, proclaiming the necessity of knowledge, law, and order for their own sakes and often at knife’s-edge. These give way to the sceptics, typified by Carneades and Diogenes. These are sceptics of the idea that there can be such an order. Such quarrels lead to a vicious circle—a trap in which each stoical response is countered by a sceptical one.<sup>41</sup>

Hegel claims that the only way through this circle is by way of faith. Faith manifests in the coming of the God-man, the figure of Christ presaged in ancient Jewish religion, incarnate at the height of the Augustan Empire of Rome, and fully realized as Spirit only at the dawn of the Protestant Reformation through Martin Luther. Hegel says, “He [Christ] relinquishes Himself for ‘the enjoyment of consciousness’, that is to say, for us.”<sup>42</sup> Christ and the manifestation of Christ as Holy

Spirit—first in the guise of the Church, then in the guise of lay social life, and finally in the guise of Reason itself—breaks through the incessant conflict and moves us beyond the vicious circle of “unhappy consciousness.”<sup>43</sup> The presence of the Holy Spirit that is Christ dwelling within us, within social institutions, and within nation-states is the possibility of the transformation of freedom from a nascent yet one-sided abstract ideal to a fully concretized and universal reality. This is the Spirit beginning to manifest itself first as self-consciousness, then as Reason, and finally as autonomous political Spirit. This is also the culmination of desire which at the beginning of the syllogism of self-consciousness was the impetus for the movement through to recognition. When taking the shapes of Reason and Spirit, this desire manifests to us as the movements through the history of Enlightenment. The developments of Science in particular, including the Science of politics and economics, are watershed moments in this movement.

### *Experimental Inquiry as Consciousness Naturalized*

#### *Experiences, Events, and Existence*

For Dewey metaphysics deals with natural events. He says,

A naturalistic metaphysics is bound to consider reflection as itself a natural event occurring within nature because of traits of the latter. It is bound to inference from the empirical traits of thinking in precisely the same way as the sciences make inferences from the happening of suns, radio-activity, thunder-storms or any other natural event. Traits of reflection are as truly indicative or evidential of the traits of other things as are the traits of these events.<sup>44</sup>

Dewey's metaphysics involves having ‘an experience’ of these events. Indeed, for Dewey experiences *are* events; they come and go as we have and undergo them. The transitory nature of an experience applies as well to the products of experiences—external objects: “A thing may endure *secula seculorum* and yet not be everlasting; it will crumble before the gnawing tooth of time, as it exceeds a certain measure. Every existence is an event.”<sup>45</sup>

For Dewey there are no supra-temporal entities. There are no Platonic realms where self-predicating beings lie; and there are no kinds which do not transform as the situation requires.

A thing “absolutely” stable and unchangeable would be out of the range of the principle of action and reaction, of resistance and leverage, as well as of friction. Here it would have no applicability, no potentiality of use as measure and control of other events. To designate the slower and the regular rhythmic events structure, and more rapid and irregular ones process, is sound practical sense. It expresses the function of one in respect to the other.<sup>46</sup>

Events for Dewey are constituted of both mind (we may think of ideas, thoughts, reflections and as I shall discuss, inquiry), and matter (traits, qualities of experiences), and together these form nature. Dewey says, "That to which both mind and matter belong is the complex of events that constitute nature."<sup>47</sup> He continues, "This becomes a mysterious *tertium quid*, incapable of designation, only when mind and matter are taken to be static structures instead of functional characters."<sup>48</sup> This meld of mind and matter in a complex of events requires further investigation. To begin with we have two kinds (mind and matter) invoked in this admittedly functionalist accounting of events. For Dewey nature is inclusive; it constitutes processes that would otherwise be characterized as 'mental'. However, Dewey does admit there is something about an event that goes beyond the usual functional accountings of experiences psychology often gives.

But in every event there is something obdurate, self-sufficient, wholly immediate, neither a relation nor an element in a relational whole, but terminal and exclusive . . . those irreducible, infinitely plural, undefinable and indescribable qualities which a thing must have in order to be, and in order to be capable of becoming the subject of relations and a theme of discourse. Immediacy of existence is ineffable.<sup>49</sup>

This "something" 'had' or 'found' is qualitative. It cannot be separated out straightforwardly from the experience had and it cannot be reduced to a functional equivalent although (as I shall show) it does have function beyond its immediacy. This is not to deny the 'reality' of objects provided they are qualified as events. We just do enjoy and entertain objects as objects. Dewey calls this enjoinder or entertainment 'esthetic': "Empirically, the existence of objects of direct grasp, possession, use and enjoyment cannot be denied. Empirically, things are poignant, tragic, beautiful, humorous, settled, disturbed, comfortable, annoying, barren, harsh, consoling, splendid, fearful; are such immediately and in their own right and behalf."<sup>50</sup>

At this point, Dewey begins to build a genetic/historical account of the development of objects from experiences. In simple terms the products of those experiences deemed worthwhile are kept, amassed, and transformed into tools for further desires. On the intellectual level these are ideas and ideals; on the existential level they are objects. 'Things', as Dewey maintains, are not just brute occurrences; rather they are products of investigation and manipulation. 'Things' always are tools both for and of reflection, even as they have existential import.

The very conception of cognitive meaning, intellectual significance, is that things in their immediacy are subordinated to what they portend and give evidence of. An intellectual sign denotes that a thing is not taken immediately but is referred to something that may come

in consequence of it. Intellectual meanings may themselves be appropriated, enjoyed and appreciated; but the character of intellectual meaning is instrumental.<sup>51</sup>

Thus far what we have is an account of events composed of mind and matter which are functions. Mind and matter are products of experience and in this sense tools that are then used to form further desirable experiences. An object or thing is an event with intellectual significance; as all events come into being and pass on so does every object, every thing, and this is inclusive of so-called metaphysical entities.

Dewey must not be understood as saying that experiences have no common characteristics about them. Indeed, there are traits of existence found in every experience although in very different degrees.<sup>52</sup> These traits are qualitative; that is to say, they are characteristics by which we find experiences more or less satisfactory. When we investigate an experience, we do so because we have found it to be highly satisfactory or dissatisfactory. Satisfaction consists in the quality of an experience had. Experiences, like all events, come into being and pass away; however, they do not do so without a qualitative effect on us. This immediate qualitative effect impels us to investigate further how we can augment our experiences. Elsewhere Dewey has called these existential traits "biological."<sup>53</sup> By this he means that they are common to other organisms and that they are natural (not mental) results of our transactions with the environment. The quest for satisfactory experiences is both the biological and social driver for human beings to transform their environments and themselves.

### *Self and Mind*

Regardless of the context, we are attempting to transform an unsettled or problematic situation into a settled one.<sup>54</sup> We are attempting to resolve a felt need, a problem, and an indeterminacy. We do so chiefly by our desire, not necessarily conscious, to have and to undergo satisfying experiences. When we do this, when we investigate our experiences, we find that

To follow the clues of experience is to see that the so-called sensible world is a world of immediate beginnings and endings; not at all an affair of cases of knowledge but a succession of qualitative events; while the so-called conceptual order is recognized to be the proper object of science, since it constitutes the scheme of constant relationships by means of which spare, scattered and causal events are bound together into a connected history. These emergent immediate events remain the beginning and the end of knowledge; but since their occurrence is one with their being sensibly, affectionally and appreciatively had, they are not themselves things known.<sup>55</sup>

Here we have the return of 'mind' and 'matter' in different guise. Rather than these being existential (or abstract-ideal) kinds, they are functions that allow us to delineate what science does and what the sensible world of experience provides. The latter is of course the possibility of the former; and the former is what will be put to use to enrich the latter. We should see the relationship between these as reciprocal; the quest for satisfying experiences results in investigation. It is in this investigation (I will now call this 'inquiry') that we note linkages between experiences and events. These linkages bring us closer together in our union with the environment.

Just as past teaching regarding sun and earth have conditioned subsequent behavior, have produced organic modifications in the way of habit which influence subsequent reactions, including interpretations, so with what was taught by having been implicated in a consummatory union of environment and organism. Here in addition, a bias in organic modification is set up; it acts to perpetuate, wherever possible, awareness of fruitions, and to avert perception of frustrations and inconvenient interruptions.<sup>56</sup>

It is out of this union of organism and environment through investigation of experience and its traits that 'self' is born. Dewey's notion of self is the product or resultant of inquiry into the transaction between human organism and world. It is the product of an investigation into the nature of our relationships with our environment and one another. "Personality, selfhood, subjectivity are eventual functions that emerge with complexly organized interactions, organic and social."<sup>57</sup> As with all conceptions this self is dialectical and transitory.<sup>58</sup> There is obviously no fixed self at the root of self-hood. The conception of 'self' together with individuals comes into being and passes away as newer and better understandings of our transactions with our world and one another emerge. "The old self is put off and the new self is only forming, and the form it finally takes will depend upon the unforeseeable result of an adventure."<sup>59</sup>

Much of what has been said of the self can be said of Mind. Prevailing understandings of Mind to the contrary, it too should be viewed as an eventual function. The past understandings of this term have misled us to believe that Mind is something static or at the very least identifiable and that it is somehow to be accorded a privileged position with respect to other human traits. These understandings Dewey claims are false.

But the whole history of science, art, and morals proves that the mind that appears in individuals is not as such individual mind. The former is in itself a system of belief, recognitions, and ignorances, of acceptances and rejections, of expectancies and appraisals, of

meanings which have been instituted under the influence of custom and tradition.<sup>60</sup>

While not dismissing the importance of individual beliefs and attitudes, Dewey thinks of Mind as a set of contextualized social and cultural understandings passed to us through our speech groups and taken up by us in the guise of customs and traditions.<sup>61</sup> In this not-too-dissimilar accounting of David Hume's portrait of morals, Dewey closes off the possibility that there can be a transcendental-metaphysical accounting of Mind.

*Mind, Consciousness, and Meaning*

As Mind is a confluence of systems of beliefs, attitudes, and meanings, consciousness—the supposed 'bedrock' of mind—is given a dual function by Dewey. "While on the psycho-physical level, consciousness denotes the totality of actualized immediate qualitative differences, or 'feelings', it denotes, upon the level of mind, actualized apprehensions of meanings, that is, idea."<sup>62</sup> Dewey distinguishes between Mind and consciousness:

There is thus an obvious difference between mind and consciousness; meaning and an idea. Mind denotes the whole system of meanings as they are embodied in the workings of organic life; consciousness in a being with language denotes awareness of perception of meanings; it is the perception of actual events, whether past, contemporary or future, in their meanings, the having of actual ideas . . . The relation of mind to consciousness may be partially suggested by saying that while mind as a system of meanings is subject to disorganization, disequilibrium, perturbation, there is no sense in referring to a particular state of awareness in its immediacy as organized or disturbed. An idea is just what it is when it occurs.<sup>63</sup>

While Mind denotes the systematic *interrelations* of meanings, consciousness consists in the *perception* of these meanings. What counts as meaning, for Dewey? We have a clue in this passage from *Art as Experience*. "[E]xperience is rendered conscious by means of that fusion of old meanings and new situations that transfigures both (a transformation that defines imagination). . . ."<sup>64</sup> I believe we can conclude the following: Mind is the inclusive cluster of experiential by-products—of systems of relations built up through active investigation into existential events and situations. Mind includes tools and objects: objects that are cognitive, affective, and judgmental. Put this way, Mind is the vast interconnected storehouse of tools by which we have and undergo more and better experiences. However, it is more than simply a storehouse. Mind is the built-up arsenal of skills, habits, and techniques (including objects) we bring to bear on novel situations. Mind is historical and

social in that these tools are built up in and through our social groups, communities, and cultures over time. Mind is intellectual in that these tools we build up are cognitive-instrumental and involve ordering, controlling, discriminating, and categorizing. Moreover, Mind is affective, attentive, caring, and expressive.

For in its non-technical use, “mind” denotes every mode and variety of interest in, and concern for, things: practical, intellectual, and emotional. It never denotes anything self-contained, isolated from the world of persons and things, but is always used with respect to situations. It signifies memory. We are reminded of this and that. It also signifies attention. . . . Mind also signifies purpose; we have a mind to do this and that. Nor is mind in these operations something purely intellectual. . . . Mind is care in the sense of solicitude, anxiety, as well as of active looking after things that need to be tended; we mind our step, our course of action, emotionally as well as thoughtfully. . . . In short “to mind” denotes an activity that is intellectual, to note something; affectional, as caring and liking, and volitional, practical, acting in a purposive way.<sup>65</sup>

The larger point I am building to is that Mind is larger than any one traditional classification in its inclusivity of the past, social beliefs and attitudes, customs, habits, norms, social practices that are internalized and reconstituted as well as intellectual objects, habits of inquiry, conceptions, propositions, mathematical tools, and logical inference.

On the one hand, mind systematically relates meanings to one another. On the other hand consciousness renders experiences front and centre. We might say that consciousness *foregrounds* experiences. It is important to remember that experiences for Dewey are events that we have and undergo rather than passive objects or things existing in a mythical outside realm. We are the ones who judge experiences and this is through the presence (or absence) of the qualities or traits of existence. The way we bring experiences to consciousness is through investigation—that is, inquiry. I cannot discuss at length Dewey’s theory of inquiry here. I note only that it is central for his naturalistic metaphysical account of experience. Inquiry is the possibility of transforming experiences positively rather than being at the mercy of arbitrary events.<sup>66</sup> Consciousness *is* inquiry into events and situations. We are conscious when active experimentation is undertaken in hopes of isolating favourable traits of existence and reproducing or re-establishing these in other experiences. Dewey elsewhere calls this the settling of unsettled situations.<sup>67</sup> In the context of laboratory or physical/natural science this is certainly the case. In the context of art the expression of these qualities through an art object is paramount. Both require inquiry or active experimentation into the event such that the qualities of existence can be isolated and re-established.

*Complementary Accounts of the Emergence of Self-Consciousness?*

Here, we come to the crux of the matter at hand. How is it that Dewey's various functional terms—Mind, Consciousness, and Inquiry—operate in a dialectical fashion to understand human freedom and culture in a manner similar to though not isomorphic with Hegel's? Dewey does not reject the story Hegel tells of science and particularly the development of the science of consciousness.<sup>68</sup> When we inquire, we are doing science. Science in turn helps us to more and greater satisfying experiences.

From here I depart from individual readings of both Dewey and Hegel yet try to keep the spirit of each as I proceed. To begin, it is important to re-emphasize a point I made earlier: the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is a non-metaphysical tract. This is chiefly because it chronicles the development of Spirit as Science *not* as Logic, which in Hegel's estimation is Spirit as abstract Notion. What this means in practical terms is that fully manifested Spirit in the *Phenomenology* is worldly; it is concrete. In a more practical guise, Spirit is where we are now in terms of our understandings of culture. Culture here can be understood in Dewey's sense as the inclusive relations of human beings to their world and to one another. Certainly this is where Dewey was heading when he lamented the misunderstandings of critics towards *Experience and Nature* while re-writing the introduction in 1949.<sup>69</sup>

We should see the development of consciousness and self-consciousness in Hegel not *merely* as the development of the one-sided abstract ideal or *merely* the development of social-political mechanisms for mutual recognition; we should see it as the emergence of an idea that in time concretized to become an institution. This helps us to choose mutually opposing interpretations of Hegel's *Phenomenology* but more importantly to stress the genetic and developmental aspect of Hegel's story. When Hegel tells us that freedom as self-consciousness proceeds from concept to judgment to syllogism we may certainly understand this as an allusion to Kant's similar nomenclature for general logic. However, we must also realize that Hegel's understanding and use of logic is dynamic in a way that Kant's is not. The categories that apply are to an event in both thought (logic) and deed (history, society, politics). Precisely because of this, the logic of the *Phenomenology* operates through the storyteller (Hegel) with the requisite material already in hand. Telling the story of the development of self-consciousness is to give a circular account of the development of the concretizing of an idea (of self-consciousness as science) and not to provide a mere accounting of how it historically happened.

Without begging the question of the possibility of what constitutes an original idea, we must see Hegel as saying that an idea is an embryonic event until something else (inclusive of something within the person having an idea) comes along to push and prod it further. An idea is not complete until it is concretized. This is the fallacy vitiating

most philosophy and philosophers in Hegel's past. While the ideals in themselves are potentially valuable they remain inert and undeveloped until they are placed in relation to something else, whether this is another ideal or an application of an existent ideal. Indeed, only those ideals that have met this criterion become fully institutionalized. To take but one, and perhaps the most important, example, freedom only realizes itself in and through its concrete presence in social-political institutions.

Stressing the non-metaphysical account of the *Phenomenology* brings us closer to Dewey's naturalistic-metaphysical account of experience particularly as developed in *Experience and Nature* and *Art as Experience*. In these texts experience is the fundamental existential relationship we have with nature. Experience is furthermore an event. It comes to be and passes away. Experience is not static though for the purposes of experimentation elements of experience can be isolated and (in thought at least) fixed. This 'fixing' of elements is the realm of Mind. Mind constitutes these as well as other relations we build up intellectually and socially. Mind is a functional term denoting the systems of relations that we possess and use in our transactions with nature and with one another. Consciousness is the deliberate attempt to investigate; to inquire into events by isolating qualities of an experience and using the tools of ordering, sorting, categorizing, inferring—in short, thinking. The build up of Mind is the build up of customs, habits, skills, techniques, understandings, and practices that cut across intellectual and social contexts. Dewey calls this understanding of Mind "culture."

What Hegel attempts with the story of the development of the Science of Self-consciousness and Spirit Dewey attempts similarly with the story of the development of Mind and Culture. His wish to change the title from *Experience and Nature* to *Nature and Culture* is of a piece with his desire to emphasize the inclusivity of humanity rather than the individual account of our transactions. To carry this through a genetic-developmental account of how we begin to think to the present is required. This story must stress not only conceptual-intellectual development but experiential, social, and institutional developments as well. In Hegel's terms it must not only seek to understand ideas in themselves but also to grasp ideas concretized. What culture is cannot be reduced to a bare set of abstract ideals. To do so is to forget that ideas themselves have a story, a context out of which they develop. Often enough this story serves to counter other ideas. At the same time to ignore or downplay ideas is to sever concrete practices and technological applications from their roots; it ignores Mind in favour of Matter.

Hegel is the first philosopher to provide us with an emergent accounting of Self-consciousness, science, and culture. These are obviously not the only accounts Hegel develops and in Hegel's estimation,

the emergent account is preliminary to a logical one in the sense that categories emerge out of our experience of reality. Nevertheless this is where Hegel thought philosophy begins—with the movement of thought to action, idea to application, abstraction to concrete thing. Only in these latter states can an idea, a thought, or an abstraction realize itself. Dewey would concur. Any idea including conceptions and propositions is an anticipation of some demonstrable change in the world. Those ideas holding currency are the ones that terminate in a positive state of affairs while those resulting in no transformation or those that are unable to settle an unsettled situation are discarded.

Hegel's *Phenomenology* famously terminates in Absolute Knowing wherein Spirit 'comes home to itself'. This has been understood by Hegel scholars as the beginning of Absolute Logic, the end of history, the completion of philosophy, and the Kingdom of God on Earth. Yet it would be wrong to conclude that his understanding of the completion of the development of metaphysics as a *science* of the *experience* of self-consciousness is exhausted by any one of these, particularly if we are following the non-metaphysical reading of Hegel. If we turn our attention to Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics wherein Mind constitutes not only Absolute Knowing but culture, we begin to see the genius of Hegel's characterization of philosophy as its time in thought. For the development of science is the experience of self-consciousness of culture. It is the realization that what makes human beings human is culture; and science is the development of the means to understand this. We come full circle when we see with our philosophy (Dewey would say with our 'inquiries') how we became who we are. Regardless of the tropes and metaphors that Hegel invests in (both Absolute Knowing and Spirit) the accomplishments the *Phenomenology* points out to us are human. As Dewey's metaphysics is naturalistic, Hegel's has moments both transcendent *and* immanent; it is complete only when it comes full circle and turns back upon itself.

Dewey thought the naturalistic dialectic (or the dialectic of adjustment, adaptation, and growth) a useful remedy to spurious absolutist dialectics to which he saw German Idealism fall prey. I think Dewey was correct to emphasize the biological, genetic, and historical accounting of the development of human culture but mistaken if his attribution of a "maximally coherent experience" as an ideal to which all experiences are to look applies to Hegel's 'odyssey' in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.<sup>70</sup> Certainly the terminus of the Science of Knowledge in the *Phenomenology* was Absolute Knowing. However much this was religious in that its 'nature' was God, it was also very much worldly and concrete with the history (intellectual, ethical, and political) of the past composing the vast ingredients of culture. The emergent accounting Hegel provides here is every bit as vital to science as the religious-metaphysical locus of the Absolute at the end of the journey.

### Conclusion

Self-consciousness as Hegel's thematic development in the *Phenomenology* is variously Freedom, Knowledge, Science, and Absolute Knowing. For Dewey, Science was inquiry: the settling of an unsettled situation through deliberate investigation and experimentation. Without making science into Science, Dewey insisted on the importance of inquiry for specialized fields and everyday living and problem solving. Inquiry was the way and means of the positive transformation of culture and the surest method of building meaningful relations whether intellectual, practical, technical, or social. The consciousness Dewey speaks of—the consciousness of Mind—is this active relating. Consciousness is the operation of this active experimental transformation.

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## NOTES

1. John Shook, *Dewey’s Empirical Theory of knowledge and Reality*, esp. pp 71–120.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 266. James Good has questioned this “break”; for Good, breaking with the ‘absolute’ of Idealism commits Dewey to a form of epistemic foundationalism. See James Good. *A Search for Unity in Diversity: the Permanent Hegelian Deposit in the Thought of John Dewey*, 137ff. I see the central issue between Shook and Good as one of how to interpret Dewey’s ‘break’; for Shook, Dewey abandoned Absolute Idealism (meaning Hegel), but not idealism; for Good, Dewey abandoned neo-Hegelian idealism (e.g., Green, Caird, Bradley) but not Hegel.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 152; p. 265.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 113; p. 18. Shook has neo-Idealism rather than Hegel specifically in mind. Dewey’s relationship to Hegel is not addressed.
5. James Garrison, “The ‘Permanent Deposit’ of Hegel in Dewey’s Theory of Inquiry,”; James Scott Johnston, “Dewey’s Critique of Kant.”
6. James Good, *A Search for Unity in Diversity: The Permanent Hegelian Deposit in the Thought of John Dewey*, p. 186. I agree with Good, and this paper seeks to push his conclusion into the realms of experience and particularly consciousness as Dewey discusses in *Experience and Nature*.
7. This term is not invented by Good. Robert Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy*, p. 62, and George Dykhuizen, *The Life and Mind of John Dewey*, p. 70 consider the terminology. Dykhuizen uses the term in reference to Dewey’s post-1890s works. Unfortunately Westbrook interprets what Dewey is saying as only confined to moral/ethical features of experience. Westbrook criticizes the use of the term ‘idealist’ in reference to Dewey’s work after the late 1890’s. Shook also demurs on this point, calling Dewey a “naïve realist” and claiming Dewey only used the term, “experimental idealism” in his 1894 “Study of Ethics: A Syllabus”. See John Shook, *Dewey’s Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality*, pp. 243–246.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 301.
9. John Dewey, “From Absolutism to Experimentalism,” p. 150; John Shook, *Dewey’s Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality*, p. 259.
10. I am thinking of the criticisms of German Idealism Dewey brings forward in such works as *German Philosophy and Politics* and *The Quest for Certainty*.
11. While there is widespread agreement that the *Phenomenology* ranges across metaphysical, epistemological, social, and historical *topoi*, there is less consensus

on which reading should predominate. Unfortunately, I cannot delve into this. However, a number of recent authors have argued for readings preponderantly metaphysical, non-metaphysical, or epistemological. For an overall view that uses these categories to discuss variant readings see Dietmar Heidemann, "Substance, Subject, System: the Justification of Science in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*,"; For a non-metaphysical reading, see the following: Robert Pippin's Introduction, in *Hegel's Idealism: the Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness*; Terry Pinkard *German Philosophy from 1760–1860*; Terry Pinkard *Hegel's Phenomenology: the Sociality of Reason*; Robert Pippin, "The 'Logic of Experience' as 'Absolute Knowledge'," . For a metaphysical reading, see Rolf-Peter Horstmann, "Substance, Subject, and Infinity: A Case Study of the Role of Logic in Hegel's System"; see also Frederick Beiser, *Hegel*. (But see Pippin's retort in "The 'Logic of Experience' as 'Absolute Knowledge'," ). For epistemological readings, see Tom Rockmore's *Hegel, Idealism, and Analytic Philosophy*; and *An Introduction to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*.

12. Rolf-Peter Horstmann, "Substance, Subject and Infinity: A Case Study of the Role of Logic in Hegel's System," p. 83. This is how Horstmann understands non-metaphysical readings of Hegel. Horstmann is unconvinced by these readings because he sees an unwavering categorical substrate laying claims for logical necessity within the system.

13. Almost no one recommends a fully naturalized Hegel except perhaps Richard Rorty in "Dewey between Hegel and Darwin." See also Allen Hance, "Pragmatism as Naturalized Hegelianism: Overcoming Transcendental Philosophy?" Good also talks of Dewey's "naturalization" of Hegel, inasmuch as Dewey renders Hegelian themes and tropes in late nineteenth century biological tropes.

14. Frederick Beiser, *Hegel* esp. p. 55; Rolf-Peter Horstmann, "Substance, Subject, and Infinity: A Case Study of the Role of Logic in Hegel's System," p. 83.

15. See Robert Pippin. *Hegel's Idealism: the Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness*, Terry Pinkard. *Hegel's Phenomenology: the Sociality of Reason*,

16. G. W. F. Hegel. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 109.

17. *Ibid.*, p.112.

18. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, , A51.

19. *Ibid.*

20. H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Ladder* Vol. 1: *The Pilgrimage of Reason*, pp. 264–276. Kant is also invoked at pp. 279–281.

21. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 143.

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*, p. 141.

24. Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, esp. p. 5.

25. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 161.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 162–163.

27. See Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, and *Critique of Pure Reason*, , A69, A321–322.

28. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 175.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*, p. 178

31. *Ibid.*, p. 179

32. *Ibid.*, p. 180.

33. Harris, *Hegel's Ladder* Vol. 1: *The Pilgrimage of Reason*, pp. 321–328.

34. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 180

35. Ibid.
36. Harris, *Hegel's Ladder* Vol. 1: *The Pilgrimage of Reason*, pp. 429–431. The pertinent passages Harris discusses are at pp. 229–231 of the *Phenomenology*.
37. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 181.
38. Ibid., p. 192.
39. Ibid., p. 196.
40. We see this most clearly in the final chapter of the section on Reason, which Hegel terms “Objective Spirit.” This precedes Absolute Spirit or Reason which for Hegel, in the context of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, is Religion.
41. Ibid., p. 209.
42. Ibid., p. 220.
43. Ibid., p. 228.
44. John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 62.
45. Ibid., p. 63.
46. Ibid., p. 64.
47. Ibid., p. 66.
48. Ibid., p. 66.
49. Ibid., p. 74.
50. Ibid., p. 82.
51. Ibid., p. 105.
52. Ibid., p. 82.
53. John Dewey, *Logic: the Theory of Inquiry*,. See especially Chapter 2—“The Biological Matrix of Inquiry.”
54. Ibid., p. 108.
55. John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 113.
56. Ibid., pp. 258–259.
57. Ibid., p. 162.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., pp. 188–189.
60. Ibid., p. 170.
61. John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, esp. p. 43.
62. John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 229.
63. Ibid., p. 230.
64. John Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 279.
65. Ibid., p. 277.
66. Ibid., pp. 30–31.
67. John Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, p. 108.
68. Harris, *Hegel's Ladder* Vol. 1: *The Pilgrimage of Reason*, pp. 8–18.
69. See John Dewey, “Experience and Nature: A New Introduction,” in *Experience and Nature*.
70. John Shook, *Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality*, p. 152. The attribution is Shook's.